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Abstract 
Polarization is an interesting additional social indicator for analyzing income inequality and poverty 
across countries, as it captures the phenomenon of ‘clustering around extreme poles’. Rising income 
polarization can be harmful since it is closely linked to poverty, social exclusion, social tension and 
social unrest (Brzezinski, 2013). However, so far little literature has been devoted to the changes in 
income polarization across countries over time, especially within Europe. Moreover, not much is 
known about whether and to what extent market income and the tax-transfer system contribute to 
changes of polarization. This paper provides theoretical and empirical insights into this relatively new 
dimension of income distribution. Rising income polarization has been observed outside Europe, but 
within the EU, polarization is relatively unexplored. We therefore broaden the analysis using 
micro-data from EU-SILC to 28 EU countries and 3 non-EU countries over the period 2004-2012. The 
paper estimates income polarization and decomposes the estimated polarization by country clusters, 
and Europe-wide, using a decomposition technique we developed.  
The main conclusions are: 
(1) Income polarization is rather stable over the decade in European countries, and Europe-wide. It 
was rising among West-EU15 countries in the sub-period 2004-2008, but declining afterwards. 
The opposite development is witnessed for CEE New Member States. Despite the Great Recession 
we do not find a sizeable increase in income polarization. 
(2) The causes of changes in polarization between 2004 and 2012 vary to a large extent across 
countries – no general pattern is found, although polarization was upward driven by market 
income (mainly capital income), while tax-benefit systems were polarization-reducing. 
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1. Background and motivation  
It is one of the main objectives of the European Union to enhance economic and social cohesion 
both between and within member countries (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union). On 17 
June 2010 the European Council agreed to reduce the number of Europeans at-risk of-poverty or 
social exclusion by at least 20 million. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) on social 
exclusion should be transformed to improve national policy making towards this common goal 
(Cantillon & Vandenbroucke, 2014; Van Vliet and Wang, 2015). However, what is known about 
the period since the early 2000s shows a mixed experience across EU countries in terms of 
changes in the risk-of-poverty rate and, closely related, levels of income inequality. The 
explanations for this are many and various (Nolan et al., 2014). There are sizeable differences 
across member states in the levels of within country income inequality and poverty, especially 
since the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007. With respect to the recent EU enlargement 
it is particularly interesting to see how the new member states compare to the well-established 
welfare states of Western Europe. 
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income inequality 
has produced a wide range of studies (see Gottschalk & Smeeding, 1997; Caminada & 
Goudswaard, 2001; Brandolini & Smeeding, 2007; OECD, 2008, 2011 and 2015; Lambert et al., 
2010 and Immervoll & Richardson, 2011). It is now widely acknowledged that from the 
mid-1990s onwards poverty outcomes in EU and OECD countries have been rather disappointing. 
Despite a continuous dynamic of economic growth, increasing employment rates, and high levels 
of social spending in the pre-crisis period before 2008, poverty either rose or stayed stable, with 
only a few countries reporting a significant fall (OECD, 2008, 2011 and 2015). Even the 
Scandinavian model has generally been unapt to counter this trend. For example, poverty 
increased significantly in Sweden and Finland but remained unchanged in Denmark (Morelli et al., 
2015). In seeking to understand the disappointing progress on EU-agreed upon social indicators, 
existing research has partly focused on what has happened at the lower end of the income 
distribution (poverty rates). Many other empirical studies have relied on popular inequality 
measures as the Gini index, which is most sensitive to changes in the middle of the distribution.  
In this paper we shift focus by applying an income polarization indicator. Several authors argue 
that the relevant distributional phenomenon is not inequality, but polarization (Duclos et al., 
2004; Duro, 2005). Intuitively, polarization (defined formally below) is related to but distinct 
from inequality and poverty and aims to capture the distance or separation between clustered 
groups in a distribution. Income polarization might be harmful, as it is closely linked to social 
exclusion, social tension, and social unrest (Esteban & Ray, 1994, 1999 and 2011; Duclos et al., 
2004). Traditional indices such as poverty and inequality, cannot describe properly the level of 
potential conflict underlying the income distribution (Duro, 2005; Gasparini et al., 2008). In this 
sense, polarization of income appears to be a better measure, since it captures the phenomenon 
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of ‘diminishing middle class’ or ‘clustering around extreme poles’, which can be associated with 
a ‘divided society’ (Zhang & Kanbur, 2001; Edward, 2006; Whelan & Maitre, 2009). Recently, 
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of job polarization. The OECD indicates that the 
employment shares of middle skill, often routine-tasks jobs have declined significantly in all 
OECD countries (OECD 2015: 147). This phenomenon may be related to technological 
advancements, but also to other factors, such as the growth of non-standard employment. In 
this paper we focus on income polarization.  
The contribution to the literature we make is twofold. First, income polarization has attracted 
increasing attention outside the EU. Overall, the conclusion of the current state of the art 
literature seems to be that in general income polarization has grown over the past few decades, 
but that there is considerable variation across countries (Seshanna & Decornez, 2003; Duro, 
2005; Brzezinski, 2013). Instead, research on income polarization in the EU is relatively rare.1 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study addressing income polarization considering 
Europe as a whole or the trends in income polarization in most recent times. Therefore, the first 
contribution of this study is to track the trends in income polarization in EU member states, thus 
adding another perspective to the comparative research on income distribution. We analyze the 
period 2004-2012, so we also capture the period of the Great Recession. We further split the 
period into two, using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects before and since the Great 
Recession. Economic factors strongly affected incomes and employment, and hence inequality 
and poverty, over this decade. But countries also took different policy routes since the Lisbon 
Treaty, so experiences may provide lessons on the different tax-benefit policies to achieve the 
European Union’s ambitions for social inclusion. 
The second contribution lies in the decomposition of the changes of income polarization. 
Specifically, we are interested in how work income, capital income, social transfers, and taxes 
are related to the changes of income polarization. It has been pointed out that there has been 
pervasive job polarization in EU, resulting in unequally distributed and polarizing market income 
(Goos et al., 2009; Massari et al., 2013). Since market income is the main component of 
disposable income, polarization of market income may also lead to polarization of disposable 
income. In addition to labor income, business and property income also contribute to unequally 
distributed income (Paul, 2004). The tax-transfer system is the other driving force behind the 
disposable income distribution (Wang et al., 2012; 2014). Differences in the form and structure 
of welfare provision or changes in taxation might also contribute to the trends in polarization 
                                                             
1  Based on analysis of Dutch cities, Burgers (1996) points out that the number of individuals and households at 
the top and bottom ends of the income distribution have grown considerably and this trend has been paralleled 
by increasing unemployment and greater insecurity in the labor markets. In a case study for Spain, Gradín 
(2000) observes a declining polarization between 1973 and 1991. So far, most of the existing literature on 
income polarization is based on a limited number of cities or regions (see also Castro, 2003; Ezcurra et al., 
2005). 
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(Hamnett, 1996). The impact of the tax-transfer system on income inequality measures as the 
Gini coefficient has been widely studied, but not the impact on polarization.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the polarization indicator and describes its 
characteristics (also in relation to other popular indicators of the distribution of income) and our 
decomposition technique. Section 3 describes our data (EU-SILC). Section 4 contains empirical 
analyses on both the level and change of polarization in 31 European countries, and Europe wide, 
for the period 2004-2012. Section 5 decomposes the change of polarization over time and across 
countries by income source. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Characteristics of the polarization indicator 
 
2.1 The polarization indicator 
Polarization describes the degree to which a population is segregated into groups in a society 
(Gradín, 2000). Polarization is an important issue but has largely been neglected in ‘mainstream’ 
economics until recently. This is remarkable since the income distribution has polarized and the 
middle class has shrunk in a number of countries (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). Polarization 
detects the presence or disappearance of groups in a distribution and captures the phenomena 
of ‘diminishing middle class’ or ‘a divided society’ (Zhang & Kanbur, 2001). High polarization may 
lead to less social mobility. In a highly polarized society, individuals in each cluster feel closer to 
each other but distant to other groups, causing barriers for mobility between groups. 
Consequently, the relatively poor face difficulties in moving up the income ladder (Motiram & 
Sarma, 2014). 
The literature on measurement of income polarization can be traced back to Foster & Wolfson 
(1992, 2010). Focusing on two income groups, they developed a bi-polarization index.2 More 
recent efforts go beyond two groups to an arbitrary number of income groups. Especially, 
Esteban & Ray (1994) and Duclos et al. (2004) derive the ‘identification-alienation’ framework to 
assess individuals’ identity with one another belonging to the same group and alienation from 
those belonging to other groups. According to Esteban & Ray (1994), polarization can be 
characterized by three features: a high degree of identification (homogeneity) within groups; a 
high degree of alienation (heterogeneity) across groups; and a small number of significantly 
sized groups. Particularly, groups of insignificant size (e.g., isolated individuals) carry little 
weight. Based on this framework, more polarization arises in case of stronger identification 
among people within a group or more alienation between groups.  
Suppose vi denote the population share of group i and μi denotes the average income. Esteban 
& Ray (1994) express polarization as: 
 
                                                             
2  The bi-polarization index can be expressed as 𝑃𝐹𝑊 = (𝐺
𝐵 − 𝐺𝑊)
𝜇
𝑚
,  where 𝐺𝐵, GW, μ, and m are within group 
inequality, between group inequality, the mean and the median income of the distribution. 
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ER = K ∑ ∑ vi
1+αvj
s
j=1
s
i=1 |μi − μj|, 
 
where K is accounted for normalization and α is the sensitivity parameter.3 ER equals to Gini 
coefficient when α = 0 or only one individual exists in each group.  
ER is based on a discrete, finite set of income groups which suffers from the limitation of 
discontinuity in a continuous ambient space of possible income values. In this paper we apply the 
following family of polarization estimators refined by Duclos et al. (2004)4 for continuous 
distributions: 
 
D𝐸𝑅 = (
1
𝑛
) ∑ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖)
𝛼
𝑛
𝑖=1
?̂?(𝑦𝑖) 
 and ?̂?(𝑦𝑖) = ?̂? + 𝑦𝑖 [(
1
𝑛
) (2𝑖 − 1) − 1] − (
1
𝑛
)[2 ∑ 𝑦𝑗 +
𝑖−1
𝑗=1 𝑦𝑖] 
 
where ?̂? captures the sample mean, 𝑓(𝑦𝑖)
𝛼 is estimated by non-parametrical kernel estimation. 
If α = 0, the measure is equal to the popular Gini coefficient of inequality. However, Duclos et al. 
(2004) impose additional axioms on the polarization measure. To meet these axioms, α must be 
bounded: α ∈ [0.25, 1]. Taking into account this relationship between DER and Gini, we may 
expect that low values for 𝛼 should produce the values of the DER indices that are close in 
practice to the values of Gini, while values for 𝛼 close to 1 leads potentially to the highest 
disparity between Gini and the DER indices.  
In what follows, DER will be estimated for the whole set of European countries, divided by 
West-EU15 and CEE NMS countries. The division is asked for by different geography, different 
resource endowments, different initial conditions and regional social policies. These have 
resulted in different income levels and distributions across regions.  
 
2.2 The relationship between polarization and income inequality 
The polarization index lies, as the Gini coefficient, between 0 and 1. Polarization and Gini equal 
0 for a perfectly equal distribution of incomes. However, polarization is fundamentally different 
from inequality.5 Inequality concerns the distances of different individuals in a society from the 
population mean. Polarization, on the other hand, is closer to the notion of segregation than 
income inequality (Esteban & Ray, 1994). Polarization places both emphasis on income 
differences and income clusters, comparing the homogeneity within a group with the overall 
heterogeneity of a given population (Castro, 2003). As such, polarization depicts the extent of 
                                                             
3     The α is bounded [0, 1.6] to satisfy the axioms imposed on the ER and other intuitive properties of the measure 
(Esteban & Ray, 1994). 
 
4  The DER is refined to decompose the identification ingredient and alienation ingredient additively.  
5
  The main differences between the three notions of inequality, bipolarization and polarization are also discussed 
by Deutsch et al. (2013). 
6 
similarities among members in a group and the distances between groups.  
In practice, polarization and income inequality may not go hand in hand. Both inequality and 
polarization will decline if there is an ‘equalizing transfer’ of income from an individual above the 
median to an individual with income below the median. However, inequality and polarization 
might diverge when there are equalizing transfers entirely on one side of the median (Wolfson, 
1994; 1997). The difference between inequality and polarization can be described by a 
hypothetical example where one individual owns the total income and all others none. In this 
case, inequality reaches the upper bound but the society is hardly polarized. 
Polarization and income inequality can even move in opposite directions; see Table 1 (see also 
Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). Assume that the multiple-peaked distribution evolved from the 
uniform distribution; some middle incomes have disappeared, while both low and high income 
groups grew. Total income of the whole population has remained the same. Note that the multi 
peaked distribution is more polarized than the uniform distribution. However, the more polarized 
multi peaked distribution is also more equal (the Lorenz curve of the multi peaked distribution 
lies closer to the egalitarian than the Lorenz curve of the uniform distribution). As a result, the 
Gini coefficient of the multi peaked distribution is lower than the Gini of the uniform distribution. 
The same holds for the s80/s20 ratio. In this example, higher polarization is accompanied by 
lower income inequality. Overall, income inequality and polarization are two different concepts 
that should be examined separately when analyzing income distributions (Ezcurra, 2009). 
Phenomena such as ‘the disappearing middle class’ or ‘clustering around extremes’ do not 
appear to be easily captured by standard measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient.  
 
Table 1: A numerical example on the relationship between polarization and Gini 
 Uniform distribution  Multi-peaked distribution 
 # households income  # households income 
       3 25  1 25 
 3 50  7 50 
 3 75  1 75 
 3 100  3 100 
 3 12  1 125 
 3 150  7 150 
 3 175  1 175 
 21 2,100  21 2,100 
      Gini coefficient  0.29   0.26 
Ratio S80/S20  5.40   3.57 
Polarization index  0.38   0.43 
 
But would conclusions drawn from comparisons of inequality measures (Gini and poverty rates) 
be reversed or significantly changed if we use polarization measures in comparing societies over 
time? Empirical evidence is mixed. Zhang & Kanbur (2001) find that, contrary to theoretical 
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expectations, the new measures of polarization do not generate very different results from the 
standard measures of inequality. Ravallion & Chen (1997) performed a cross-country 
comparison of the Gini coefficient and the bi-polarization index, and concluded ‘there is a 
surprisingly close correspondence between them for these data’. Duclos et al. (2004), Vega et al. 
(2006), and Brzezinski (2013) on the other hand provide evidence that inequality and 
polarization indices differ empirically and in significant ways. So the issue of whether polarization 
and inequality (poverty rates) can be distinguished empirically has been a matter of some 
debate. For this reason we compare both levels and trends for the Gini index of inequality, 
poverty rates and social exclusion with levels and trends for the polarization indicator.  
 
2.3 Decomposition 
To estimate the contributions of income sources to income polarization over time, this study 
relies on Shapley decomposition and on growth redistribution decomposition6. With the Shapley 
decomposition, the marginal contribution of each income component is calculated on the basis of 
all possible routes considering the combination of changes in all other components. For instance, 
supposing disposable income consists of n components 𝑥𝑘 ∈ {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑘 , ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛}, the marginal 
effect of 𝑥𝑘 on polarization over time is thus the average of ∆𝑝(𝑥𝑘) obtained from all routes with 
all possible combinations of changes in other components. More specifically, for each of the other 
determinants, there are two statuses in period 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 with or without change. Therefore, 
there are 2𝑛−1 combinations of changes with regards to the other 𝑛 − 1 determinants. Using 
Shapley decomposition, all contributions can be added up to 100% of the total changes in 
polarization with no residual left. 
Following, the partial effect of each income component on polarization can be divided into a 
growth effect and a redistribution effect; see Wang & Wan (2014). The growth effect shows 
changes in polarization led by the changes in the average income component. The redistribution 
effect represents polarization changes due to resource reallocation. In the Appendix E, we  
present the growth effect and the redistribution effect of each income component in detail, both 
mathematically and empirically. 
Table 2 presents the components composing of disposable household income in our dataset 
(described in section 3). All incomes are expressed in gross values and converted into euros of 
2005 (deflating by a country-specific consumer price index taken from World Bank, 2013). In 
this paper, disposable income will be decomposed into three main income components, namely 
market income from labor and capital, social benefits and taxes. To decompose the effects of 
market income, social benefits, and taxes on changes of polarization, we use Shapley 
decomposition which considers all possible sequences of changes of income sources, and growth 
and redistribution decomposition which shows the effects of income growth and redistribution on 
                                                             
6
  Araar (2008) provides another way to decompose the level of polarization by population group and income 
source. 
8 
polarization separately. For the three main income components, we present the partial effect of 
each income component which is the sum of the partial growth effect and the partial 
redistribution effect; see Appendix E for details.  
 
Table 2: Composition household disposable income 
 
 Labor income 
 Market income 
 
  
+ Capital income 
   
 
 Unemployment benefits 
Disposable  
 
+ Old-age and survivor pension benefits 
household income Social benefits + Sickness/Disability benefits 
  
+ Education allowance 
  
+ Minimum income protection 
   
 
Taxes  Taxes and contributions 
 
 
3. Data 
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is the EU reference 
source for micro income data. Many EU indicators designed to monitor income inequality, 
poverty and social inclusion in the EU are based on EU-SILC. The reference population of 
EU-SILC consists of private households residing in the participating countries at the moment of 
selection. Currently 31 countries are involved in the EU-SILC process, namely all 28 EU Member 
States plus 3 non-EU members: Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. For the analysis presented in 
this paper, EU-SILC 2004-2012 data of 31 countries are taken into account.  
EU-SILC contains detailed information on individual and household characteristics as well as 
income by source. Disposable income is defined as the sum of gross market income and cash 
benefits, net of direct taxes and social insurance contributions; it is adjusted for differences in 
household size and composition using the modified LIS’ equivalence scales.  
EU-SILC is unique since it provides information on a wide range of social indicators. It should 
however be noted that there are considerable differences between participating countries in 
EU-SILC in terms of sample design, sample frame and data source (e.g. Goedemé, 2013). 
In this paper we assess the effect of tax-benefit income components on the polarization of 
household disposable income, on poverty and income inequality in 31 EU countries in 2004-2012. 
We further split the period into two using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects before and 
since the Great Recession. We computed the polarization measure (for a range of values of α; 
see Appendix D for details) for household disposable income, equivalized using the square-root 
scale, and weighted with EU-SILC household sample weights multiplied by the number of 
persons in the household. Following common practice (see, e.g. Duclos et al., 2004), we 
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excluded non-positive incomes. In line with Eurostat practice, no top–coding of income has been 
applied. All incomes are expressed in gross values and converted into euros of 2005 (deflating by 
a country-specific consumer price index taken from World Bank, 2013). Available countries and 
data years are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Available countries and data years in EU-SILC 
West-EU15 
 
 
CEE NMS-13 
 
 AT Austria 2004-2012 BG Bulgaria 2007-2012 
BE Belgium 2004-2012 CY  Cyprus 2005-2012 
DE Germany 2005-2012 CZ  Czech Republic 2005-2012 
DK Denmark 2004-2012 EE Estonia 2004-2012 
ES  Spain 2004-2012 HR Croatia 2011-2012 
FI Finland 2004-2012 HU  Hungary 2005-2012 
FR France 2004-2012 LT  Lithuania 2005-2012 
GR Greece 2004-2012 LV Latvia 2005-2012 
IE Ireland 2004-2012 MT Malta 2008-2012 
IT Italy 2004-2012 PL  Poland 2005-2012 
LU Luxembourg 2004-2012 RO Romania 2007-2012 
NL  Netherlands 2005-2012 SI  Slovenia 2005-2012 
PT Portugal 2004-2012 SK  Slovakia 2005-2012 
SE Sweden  2004-2012 
   
UK United Kingdom 2005-2012 Other 
  
   
CH Switzerland 2008-2012 
 
  
IS Iceland 2004-2012 
   
NO Norway 2004-2012 
 
Note: No time-series analyses for countries presented in italic due to lack of quality of data (no gross incomes) for 
ES (2004-2005), FR (2004-2006), GR(2004-2006), IT (2004-2006), LV (2005-2006), PT(2004-2006), or missing 
data for BG (2004-2006), HR(2006-2010), MT(2004-2007), RO(2004-2006), and CH(2004-2007). 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptives around 2012 
In what follows, polarization will be estimated for the whole set of European countries, divided by 
West-EU15 and CEE NMS countries. The division is asked for by different geography, different 
resource endowments, different initial conditions and different social policies. These have 
resulted in different income levels across regions; see Figure 1. The highest mean equivalized 
disposable income is found in Switzerland, Norway, and Luxembourg while Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Latvia have the lowest average income. In general, the West-EU15 countries have higher 
disposable incomes than the CEE NMS countries except for Portugal.   
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Figure 1: Mean equivalized disposable income, 2012 
 
Notes: * = CEE NMS   (a)=  Non-EU countries 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC; All incomes are expressed in euros of 2005 
 
Figure 2 depicts the point estimates around 2012 for several social indicators: the polarization 
indicator, the Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable income, the at-risk-of-poverty rate 
(threshold 60% of the median income for each country) and the EU-agreed upon indicator for 
people at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion. People at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion 
consists of not only people at risk of poverty but also those who are severely materially deprived 
or living in households with very low work intensity (Eurostat, 2015). Table 4 provides the 
numbers behind Figure 2 and also shows how the country ranking differs between the social 
indicators. Countries are ranked in order of their level of the polarization indicator from smallest 
(Norway) to highest (Latvia). Polarization is relatively low in Norway, Denmark, Slovenia, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, while relatively high figures are found for the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal and Latvia. The rank of polarization is not linked to the ranks 
of other social indicators. For example, Norway ranks low in the polarization index but also in 
other social indicators. Denmark, however, ranks low in the polarization index but relatively high 
in the Gini.    
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Figure 2: Polarization indicator and other social indicators, 2012 
 
Notes: * = CEE NMS   (a)=  Non-EU countries 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
 
The comparisons presented in Figure 2 and Table 4 illustrate that income polarization is 
empirically distinguishable from income inequality, poverty and social exclusion in our sample. In 
our data for 2012, the correlation between polarization and the Gini index is rather high (Pearson 
correlation = 0.92); see Table 5. However, the correlation between polarization and indices on 
poverty or social exclusion is notably lower (0.78 resp. 0.72; see Appendix B and D for details).  
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Table 4: Polarization indicator and other social indicators, 2012 
 
 Polarization index Gini coefficient 
equivalized 
disposable income 
Poverty rate (PL60) People 
at-risk-of-poverty or 
social exclusion 
  Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank 
                  
Norway 0.165 (1) 0.225 (1) 0.100 (3) 0.137 (2) 
Denmark 0.170 (2) 0.281 (14) 0.131 (5) 0.190 (10) 
Slovenia 0.173 (3) 0.237 (2) 0.135 (8) 0.196 (13) 
Sweden 0.174 (4) 0.248 (4) 0.141 (11) 0.156 (5) 
Netherlands 0.175 (5) 0.254 (7) 0.101 (4) 0.150 (3) 
Iceland 0.175 (6) 0.240 (3) 0.079 (1) 0.127 (1) 
Czech Republic 0.177 (7) 0.249 (5) 0.096 (2) 0.154 (4) 
Slovakia 0.180 (8) 0.253 (6) 0.132 (7) 0.205 (14) 
Hungary 0.187 (9) 0.269 (10) 0.140 (9) 0.324 (25) 
Belgium 0.188 (10) 0.265 (9) 0.153 (16) 0.216 (15) 
Germany 0.189 (11) 0.283 (15) 0.161 (20) 0.196 (13) 
Finland 0.189 (12) 0.259 (8) 0.132 (7) 0.172 (6) 
Austria 0.191 (13) 0.276 (12) 0.144 (12) 0.185 (9) 
Luxembourg 0.194 (14) 0.280 (13) 0.151 (15) 0.184 (8) 
Switzerland 0.195 (15) 0.288 (16) 0.159 (18) 0.175 (7) 
Malta 0.197 (16) 0.271 (11) 0.151 (15) 0.231 (16) 
Poland 0.199 (17) 0.309 (20) 0.171 (21) 0.267 (20) 
France 0.204 (18) 0.305 (18) 0.141 (11) 0.191 (11) 
Estonia 0.204 (19) 0.325 (25) 0.175 (22) 0.234 (17) 
Ireland 0.204 (20) 0.299 (17) 0.157 (17) 0.300 (24) 
Greece 0.204 (21) 0.343 (28) 0.231 (31) 0.346 (28) 
Croatia 0.205 (22) 0.309 (20) 0.204 (27) 0.326 (27) 
Lithuania 0.206 (23) 0.320 (24) 0.186 (24) 0.325 (26) 
Italy 0.207 (24) 0.319 (23) 0.194 (26) 0.299 (23) 
Romania 0.207 (25) 0.332 (26) 0.226 (30) 0.417 (30) 
United Kingdom 0.208 (26) 0.313 (22) 0.160 (19) 0.241 (18) 
Spain 0.209 (27) 0.350 (30) 0.208 (28) 0.272 (22) 
Bulgaria 0.213 (28) 0.336 (27) 0.212 (29) 0.493 (31) 
Cyprus 0.214 (29) 0.310 (21) 0.147 (13) 0.271 (21) 
Portugal 0.216 (30) 0.345 (29) 0.179 (23) 0.253 (19) 
Latvia 0.221 (31) 0.357 (31) 0.192 (25) 0.362 (29) 
Mean-31 0.195   0.292   0.158   0.245   
 
Table 5: Pearson correlation between polarization and other social indicators 
  
Polarization 
indicator 
Gini 
coefficient 
Poverty 
(PL60) 
Social 
exclusion 
Mean disposable 
income 
Polarization indicator 1 
    
Gini coefficient 0.915** 1 
   
Poverty (PL60) 0.778** 0.863** 1 
  
Social exclusion 0.717** 0.745** 0.823** 1 
 
Mean disposable income -0.436* -0.454* -0.458** -0.647** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)    
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4.2 Cross-country time-series analyses 
We splitted the period 2004-2012 into two using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects 
before and since the Great Recession. Table 6 shows estimates for the polarization indicator for 
each country and the direction of movement in the indicator in the two sub-periods 2004-2008 
and 2008-2012.  
 
Table 6: Polarization indicator 2004, 2008 and 2012 
 
    Available in 
EU-SILC 
Polarization indicator Change over time 
  Country 2004 2008 2012 2004-2008 2008-2012 2004-2012 
                  
West-EU15               
AT Austria 2004-2012 0.183 0.188 0.191 2.9% 1.6% 4.3% 
BE Belgium 2004-2012 0.188 0.194 0.188 3.1% -3.0% 0.0% 
DE Germany 2005-2012 0.191 0.193 0.189 1.4% -2.1% -0.8% 
DK Denmark 2004-2012 0.166 0.191 0.170 15.3% -10.7% 2.9% 
FI Finland 2004-2012 0.187 0.189 0.189 1.0% 0.3% 1.3% 
IE Ireland 2004-2012 0.216 0.215 0.204 -0.5% -4.9% -5.7% 
LU Luxembourg 2004-2012 0.189 0.212 0.194 11.9% -8.4% 2.5% 
NL  Netherlands 2005-2012 0.172 0.181 0.175 5.5% -3.4% 1.8% 
SE Sweden  2004-2012 0.164 0.169 0.174 3.0% 3.4% 6.1% 
UK United Kingdom 2005-2012 0.223 0.217 0.208 -2.8% -4.2% -7.3% 
Mean-10 0.188 0.195 0.188 3.8% -3.3% 0.3% 
Coefficient of variation 0.098 0.075 0.062 -24% -17% -37% 
                  
CEE NMS-13               
CY  Cyprus 2005-2012 0.199 0.200 0.214 0.7% 6.8% 7.0% 
CZ  Czech Republic 2005-2012 0.186 0.178 0.177 -4.2% -0.4% -4.8% 
EE Estonia 2004-2012 0.220 0.200 0.204 -9.1% 2.1% -7.8% 
HU  Hungary 2005-2012 0.188 0.182 0.187 -3.0% 2.7% -0.3% 
LT  Lithuania 2005-2012 0.219 0.214 0.206 -2.5% -3.8% -6.5% 
PL  Poland 2005-2012 0.217 0.203 0.199 -6.7% -1.8% -9.1% 
SI  Slovenia 2005-2012 0.172 0.171 0.173 -0.4% 1.1% 0.6% 
SK  Slovakia 2005-2012 0.186 0.177 0.180 -4.6% 1.9% -2.8% 
Mean-8 0.198 0.191 0.193 -3.9% 1.0% -2.9% 
Coefficient of variation 0.087 0.075 0.073 -14% -3% -16% 
                  
Other                 
IS Iceland 2004-2012 0.177 0.191 0.175 7.8% -8.4% -1.2% 
NO Norway 2004-2012 0.188 0.173 0.165 -7.9% -5.0% -14.3% 
       
Mean-20 0.191 0.192 0.188 0.2% -1.9% -1.7% 
Coefficient of variation 0.094 0.076 0.074 -20% -3% -22% 
 
Note: no data for ES (2004-2005), FR (2004-2006), GR(2004-2006), IT (2004-2006), PT(2004-2006), BG 
(2004-2006), HR(2006-2010), LV (2005-2006), MT(2004-2007), RO(2004-2006), and CH (2004-2007). 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
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Table 6 shows a rise of income polarization from 2004 to 2008 for seven out of 10 West-EU15 
countries, but a decline afterwards (with the exception of three countries). The opposite 
development is witnessed for CEE New Member States: a decline of income polarization from 
2004 to 2008 for seven out of eight CEE NMS countries, but a slight increase afterwards (with the 
exception of three countries). So the pattern for West-EU15 countries differs from CEE NMS 
countries. However, differences between countries became smaller over time. The coefficient of 
variation declined from 0.094 to 0.074 across these countries (-22%), indicating convergence of 
income polarization outcomes. 
 
4.3 Other social indicators 
Figure 3 and Appendix C show results for the polarization indicator and other indicators for the 
20 countries covered by this study for the period 2004-2012. Note that eight out of 20 countries 
combined a decline of their polarization indicator with a lower Gini coefficient. In another eight 
countries both indictors increased, indicating more unequal and polarized societies, while in the 
remaining four countries one of both social indicators showed improvement in the direction of a 
more equal distribution. Including the at-risk-of-poverty-rate and/or social exclusion does not 
alter the number of countries that contribute to the objective of the European Union (EU) to 
enhance social cohesion, namely: Norway, Poland, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Lithuania, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Iceland. All other countries experienced a less equal distribution of 
income as measured by one or more of the social indicators applied. 
 
Figure 3: Correlation between changes in the polarization index and other indicators, 2004-2012 
 
3a): Correlation between changes in the polarization index and changes in Gini coefficient 
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3b): Correlation between changes in the polarization index and changes in poverty 
 
 
 
3c): Correlation between changes in the polarization index and changes in people 
at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion 
 
 
Note: simple OLS regression; t-values between brackets.  
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
 
4.4 Polarization EU-wide 
The Lisbon strategy led to the adoption in 2001 of social indicators. These indicators are deemed 
to monitor and compare the social performance of each EU member state. The picture of the 
Union emerges only by aggregation of the national evidence, and no attempt is made to directly 
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and poverty indicators are calculated as the weighted mean of national values, between-state 
inequalities as a major source of inequalities in the EU are excluded (Fredriksen, 2012). 
Instead of calculating kernel densities and polarization for each country individually, this section 
groups countries together and shows the income distribution for Europe-wide, for West-EU15 
and for CEE NMS countries. Kernel density estimation gives us an impression of the probability 
density of the equivalized disposable income in our sample. We are able to cover 20 countries for 
this analysis. When calculating kernel densities and polarization Europe-wide, it is necessary to 
make incomes comparable across countries in terms of purchasing power. Incomes are adjusted 
to take account of price level differences between countries, using purchasing power standard 
estimates taken from Eurostat (2015). The use of PPPs is not a perfect solution for making 
incomes cross-nationally comparable. For instance, they do not easily allow for a consistent 
comparison over time, as PPPs are (by necessity) constructed for a certain moment in time 
(Goedemé et al., 2014). Hence, when comparing incomes both cross-nationally and 
cross-temporally, we also have to take into account the differences in price levels (both over time 
and between countries). All incomes are therefore converted into euros of 2005 using 
country-specific consumer price indexes taken from the World Bank (2013) and purchasing 
power standards from Eurostat (2015, EU28=1). 
The graphs in Figure 4 below could be interpreted as the population-weighted income 
distributions of the countries belonging to the respective groups (West-EU15 countries, CEE NMS 
countries or Europe-wide, in line with the work of Bönke & Schröder, 2015).7 Within our grouped 
West-EU15 countries, a single pole in the distribution is found around 15 thousand equivalized 
disposable income, while this peak is much lower in CEE NMS countries (around 5 to 7 thousand 
euro); see Figure 4. While there is only one single pole in the distribution in West-EU15 countries, 
small multiple poles seem to be present in the distribution of the group with the West-EU and the 
CEE NMS countries (between around 5 to 7 thousand and around 17 thousand euro), generating 
higher polarization in this latter grouped countries compared to West-EU15 group. Multiple 
peaks are also present in our EU-wide distribution covering 20 countries in our sample, with 
peaks between around 5 to 7 and 18 thousand euro. Adding both Norway and Iceland does not 
alter the picture much. 
 
 
                                                             
7  In all the cases we use the weighting factor (RB050) from EU-SILC. 
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Figure 4: Kernel densities of disposable equivalized income Europe-wide, 2005-2012 
  
  
West-EU15 (10): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
CEE NMS-13 (8): Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.  
Non-EU countries (2): Iceland and Norway.  
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
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The level of polarization in West-EU15 countries is rather low compared to CEE NMS as can be 
seen from the summary statistics for income polarization; see Figure 5 (see also Table 7). Figure 
5 confirms a stable income polarization in West-EU15 countries and the 20 European countries 
as a whole. The polarization indicator declined significantly within our grouped CEE NMS 
countries in the period 2005-2012.  
 
Figure 5: Trend polarization indicator EU-wide, 2005-2012 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
 
4.5 The EU-wide income distribution versus country-average social indicators 
The level and evolution of inequality and poverty measured for the EU as if it was a single country 
can be regarded as basic information in evaluating the progress of the Union toward greater 
social cohesion (Brandolini, 2007). The degree of inequality or poverty measured for the EU as 
a whole is always different from the average of national values; see Table 7. For example, the 
expansion of the EU population in the mid-2000’s to include a considerable number of 
households with much lower real incomes has led to a fall of the EU median income, and hence 
of any poverty line which is based on it. Thus, in comparing the poverty rates for the EU15 and 
the EU25 (in 2007), it should be taken into account that the EU-wide poverty line drops by 9 per 
cent as a result of the enlargement; as a fifth of the people that were classified as poor using the 
EU15 line are no longer poor according to the lower EU25 line, the headcount poverty rate in the 
EU15 countries falls from 17.3 to 13.7 per cent (Brandolini, 2007). 
This is a warning against using a country-average as a proxy whenever real income differences 
are large. More generally, this exposes the weak justification of such a measure: it is unclear 
what the average of within-country relative inequality indices tells us about the distribution of 
income in Europe. 
In this section, we provide a picture of income polarization, income inequality and 
at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion in Europe as if it was a single country. It is, however, 
important to be clear about the meaning and implications of such EU-wide measures. For 
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example, the risk-of-poverty is still being defined in relative rather than absolute terms, but 
calculating the income of each household in the EU relative to the EU median level of income 
means that, in countries with the lowest income levels, the majority of the population may have 
an income below an EU poverty threshold, while most of these households are clearly not socially 
excluded in national terms. Nevertheless, reducing the proportion of the EU’s population with 
income below the threshold of 60 percent of median EU income might also be important for social 
cohesion across the Union. In this study, we take four country groups: the group of the 
West-EU15 countries, the group of the CEE NMS countries, the group of the 20 EU countries, and 
the group of all European countries. For each country group, the poverty line is set at the 60 per 
cent of the median income within the group. 
Table 7 presents our results. First note that polarization in Europe as a whole is different from the 
simple average of national polarization indicators (right panel Table 7) since the latter method 
does not take into account the between-country component of European inequality. Polarization 
is lower in the West-EU15 countries as a whole than that in the CEE NMS group. Over the period 
2005-2012, polarization remains stable in the West-EU15 countries and the 20 European 
countries while it declined significantly in the group of CEE NMS countries. 
Second, the Gini coefficient of 2012 for West-EU15 countries is around 0.3 and for all European 
countries around 0.33. Again, the results obtained are different from inequality calculated as a 
simple average of national Gini indexes. Inequality in Europe as a whole is slightly lower than in 
the United States (0.39 around 2012).
8
 The difference appears to be in both ends of the 
distribution, as both the top and bottom deciles are closer to the median in Europe (Frederiksen, 
2012). Lower inequality in Europe than in the United States is also what the literature tends to 
find, despite the scarce literature that exist on European-wide inequality; see e.g. Goedemé et 
al (2014), Bönke & Schröder (2015), Frederiksen (2012) and Brandolini (2007).  
If we measure poverty with a European-wide poverty line instead of national thresholds, poverty 
is generally higher. For instance, the poverty rate reached 22 per cent in 2005 with a 
European-wide poverty line at 60 per cent of the median income, whereas it was only about 14 
per cent with poverty lines equal to 60 per cent of the national median income. At the same time, 
the poverty trend looks rather similar. Both Europe-wide poverty and the average of national 
poverty rates decreased between 2005 and 2012, although poverty rose in West-EU15 countries. 
A similar trend can be observed if Iceland and Norway are included in the calculations. Over the 
entire period, the decline in Europe-wide poverty and income inequality is quite substantial. This 
is confirmed by simple linear regression analyses reported in Table 7. 
 
  
                                                             
8
 Data taken from OECD.Stat referring to the year 2012. 
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Table 7: Trend several social indicators Europe-wide, 2005-2012 
 
  EU-wide   Country-average 
                
  Level social indicator Change   Level social indicator Change 
  2005 2012     2005 2012   
                
Polarization Indicator               
West-EU15 (10) 0.197 0.198 0%   0.190 0.188 -1% 
CEE NMS-13 (8) 0.230 0.210 -8%**   0.197 0.193 -2% 
West-EU15 + CEE NMS 0.219 0.212 -3%*   0.193 0.190 -1%** 
European Countries (20) 0.219 0.212 -3%*   0.192 0.188 -2%** 
               
Gini coefficient     
   
      
West-EU15 (10) 0.295 0.296 0%   0.274 0.276 1% 
CEE NMS-13 (8) 0.384 0.328 -14%**   0.298 0.286 -4% 
West-EU15 + CEE NMS 0.357 0.333 -7%**   0.284 0.280 -1%* 
European Countries (20) 0.357 0.333 -7%**   0.283 0.275 -3%** 
      
 
        
Poverty rate (PL60)     
 
        
West-EU15 (10) 0.151 0.172 14%**   0.136 0.143 5%** 
CEE NMS-13 (8) 0.202 0.180 -11%   0.156 0.148 -5% 
West-EU15 + CEE NMS 0.249 0.217 -13%**   0.145 0.145 0% 
European Countries (20) 0.248 0.217 -12%**   0.141 0.140 -1% 
Note: simple OLS regression; ** significant at 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level  
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
 
 
5. Decomposition of the change of polarization by income source 
Former, extensive literature on ‘welfare state retrenchment’ that has emerged over the last 
decades seems to imply that welfare states have become less redistributive (Immervoll & 
Richardson, 2011, also published in OECD, 2011). Recent studies and data, to the contrary, show 
that most welfare states became more redistributive (see also Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005; 
Wang et al., 2014). Welfare states have not compensated completely for the rise in inequality of 
market income among households, but most have done so to some degree. By and large, welfare 
states have worked the way they were designed to work. It is markets, not redistribution policies 
that have become more inegalitarian. It should be noted here that because tax-benefit systems 
are generally progressive, one could expect that higher market income inequality automatically 
leads to more redistribution, even without policy actions (Immervoll & Richardson, 2011; Wang 
et al., 2014). But what about income polarization? 
This section examines changes in polarization across 20 European countries for the period 
2004-2012 decomposed into three income components: market income (labor and capital), 
social benefits (sum of unemployment benefits, old-age and survivor pension benefits, sickness 
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and disability benefits, education allowances, and minimum income protection), and taxes and 
social contributions to households.  
Figure 6a-6c show the changes of income polarization, further splitting the countries into 
West-EU15, CEE NMS-13 and other European countries. Countries are ranked in order of their 
change in polarization from largest to smallest. Between 2004 and 2008, the West-EU countries 
observed an increase in income polarization (see Figure 6a). Market income contributes to this 
increase to a large extent. Surprisingly, also social benefits and taxes added to more polarization. 
CEE NMS states, on contrary, saw a decrease in income polarization on average, where the 
redistribution effects of social benefits and taxes offset the polarization-increasing factor of 
market income.  
Opposite trends can be found for the period 2008-2012 (see Figure 6b). Polarization decreased 
in the West-EU countries and this was mainly because of the more redistributive effects of social 
benefits and taxes. The effect of market income is insignificant. The CEE NMS states, on the 
other hand, experienced an increase in polarization since the Great Recession. Market income 
and taxes both have a positive impact on polarization, which has not been offset by the effects 
of social benefits.  
Figure 6c shows the decomposition for the entire period 2004-2012. Polarization increased in 
most of the West EU countries, while it declined in most of the CEE NMS states. Taken together, 
polarization slightly decreased for the 20-countruy average. Market income was 
polarization-increasing on average (mainly in West-EU15 countries), while the redistributive 
effect of social benefits and taxes appears to be polarization-reducing, on average. Across 
countries the redistribution effect of social benefits and taxes is more than offsetting the 
polarization-increasing effect of dispersion of market incomes in 20 European countries in the 
period 2004-2012. However, cross-country variation is rather large. 
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Figure 6a: Change in polarization 2004-2008 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
 
Figure 6b: Change in polarization 2008-2012 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
 
Figure 6c: Change in polarization 2004-2012 due to market income, social benefits and taxes 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
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The polarization-mitigating effect across our 20-country-average is mainly the result of the 
social-benefit systems in European countries, and to a lesser extent of tax systems. 
Tax-benefits-systems were more effective in offsetting income polarization in 2012 than in the 
mid-2000’s in all countries, with Sweden, Cyprus and Hungary as exceptions. So, wefare states 
in the other 17 European countries did have an anti-poverty and equalizing effect in the period 
2004-2012, even if other factors as market incomes were pushing in the other direction and the 
overall results were disappointing (e.g. in the case of poverty reduction). 
We do not find that tax-benefit policies had become less effective before or after the Great 
Recession. Among the total population in European countries, both market income polarization 
(labor and capital) and redistribution from social benefits and taxes rose on average. This finding 
is in line with the work of Hills et al. (2014). Decomposition results including the (partial) growth 
effect and the redistribution effect for the (sub) periods 2004-2008 are presented in Appendix E. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Vast literature relies on traditional social indicators such as the Gini coefficient and relative 
poverty rates to analyze national and cross-national differences in earnings and income 
inequality. Little attention has been paid to income polarization, especially within Europe. This is 
remarkable since polarization is closely linked to social exclusion, one of the important elements 
of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 Strategy. More polarization can be associated with a 
divided society and may lead to increased social unrest. This study provides theoretical and 
empirical insights into this relatively new dimension of the income distribution. We rely on 
micro-data from EU-SILC to explore the development of polarization in 31 countries, and Europe 
as a whole over the period 2004-2012. We compare changes in polarization with changes in the 
traditional inequality indicators. Furthermore, we disentangle the change in polarization into 
effects due to changes in market income (from labor and capital), social transfers, and taxes. 
The results can be summarized in three conclusions. 
First, although polarization is closely linked to other social indicators, namely the Gini coefficient, 
the poverty rate, and the relative number of people at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion, 
polarization is conceptually and empirically distinguishable. There is considerable variation in the 
rankings of the countries regarding polarization and other popular social indicators. Polarization 
and Gini may not go hand in hand: an increase of income inequality does not necessarily relate 
to an increase of polarization.  
Second, polarization in West-EU15 countries is much lower than that in the CEE New Member 
States. Over the period 2004-2012, income polarization is rather stable in European countries, 
and Europe as a whole. Polarization was rising among the West-EU15 countries in the sub-period 
2004-2008, but declining afterwards. The CEE NMS countries witnessed an opposite 
development. Overall, several social indicators show a converging pattern over the decade, 
indicating convergence at lower levels of income polarization, inequality, at-risk-of-poverty, and 
social exclusion in Europe as a whole.  
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Third, to explore the effects of market income, social benefits, and taxes on changes in 
polarization over 2004-2012, this paper relies on Shapley decomposition and growth 
redistribution decomposition. The results vary to a large extent across European countries. On 
average, polarization was upward driven by market income. Conversely, both the tax and social 
benefit systems were polarization-reducing. As a result - despite the Great Recession – our 
polarization indicator does not point at a sizeable increase in household inequality in 20 
European countries over the last decade, because tax-benefit systems have offset the increase 
of market income inequality in European countries. We do not find that tax-benefit policies had 
become less effective before or after the Great Recession. 
However, our empirical analysis does not show why benefits and taxes have become more (or 
less) redistributive over time in European countries. It can be expected that, as market income 
inequality rises, the tax-benefit systems will automatically have a more redistributive impact 
because of the progressivity built into these systems. But also policy changes and demographic 
changes will certainly explain a part of the changes in redistribution. A wide range of factors 
influence the overall income distribution and poverty. Many of these, such as demographic 
change or the distribution of work across households, are not under the direct control of policy 
makers. In assessing the performance of government social policy in terms of (income) poverty 
or inequality reduction it is important to isolate the impact of the most relevant factors that 
policy makers are able to control, which is not done exhaustively in this paper. This might be an 
important omission if the policy changes introduced in the period considered were specifically 
designed to alter the incentive e.g. to increase labor force participation. An extension of the work 
here could attempt to further isolate policy effect from the total change in the levels and 
distribution of incomes across European countries. 
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Appendix A: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
  
Table A1: Descriptives composition disposable household income EU-SILC, 2012 
 
West-EU15 countries 
     
      
Austria - AT (# Obs: 13,904) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 22,122 23,784 0 415,457 95% 
Capital income 950 5,140 0 185,771 4% 
Unemployment benefits 427 1,330 0 21,416 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 5,867 11,428 0 143,341 25% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 614 2,487 0 56,211 3% 
Education allowance 47 389 0 12,893 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,341 1,743 0 11,855 6% 
Taxes -8,103 11,113 -289,223 37,055 -35% 
Disposable equivalized income 23,266 13,892 0 483,745 100% 
      
Belgium - BE (# Obs: 13,905) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 19,894 19,368 -594 320,028 97% 
Capital income 671 2,587 0 67,929 3% 
Unemployment benefits 1,105 3,216 0 84,911 5% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,518 7,424 0 93,665 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 636 2,200 0 21,060 3% 
Education allowance 28 284 0 16,091 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,127 1,585 0 12,969 6% 
Taxes -6,534 7,183 -109,960 14,609 -32% 
Disposable equivalized income 20,445 11,184 25 280,207 100% 
      
Germany - DE (# Obs: 27,895) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 20,681 22,015 -8,879 763,945 97% 
Capital income 966 4,328 0 173,945 5% 
Unemployment benefits 416 2,543 0 101,715 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 5,380 9,953 0 294,215 25% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 379 1,829 0 44,397 2% 
Education allowance 63 529 0 15,983 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,099 1,559 0 13,645 5% 
Taxes -7,561 9,260 -494,463 69,189 -35% 
Disposable equivalized income 21,423 13,154 135 443,428 100% 
      
Denmark - DK (# Obs: 13,300) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 37,246 29,272 -33,106 488,060 120% 
Capital income 421 9,515 -74,790 441,374 1% 
Unemployment benefits 1,748 5,442 0 247,638 6% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 4,459 11,050 0 159,631 14% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 1,905 6,204 0 216,021 6% 
Education allowance 312 1,115 0 18,511 1% 
Minimum Protection  796 925 0 8,024 3% 
Taxes -15,814 12,035 -255,944 7,746 -51% 
Disposable equivalized income 31,073 16,189 1,092 341,276 100% 
      
Spain - ES (# Obs: 33,059) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 10,851 11,321 -11,306 127,886 82% 
Capital income 310 1,666 0 47,989 2% 
Unemployment benefits 543 1,395 0 26,901 4% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,099 5,292 0 45,572 23% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 323 1,478 0 33,322 2% 
Education allowance 42 285 0 7,979 0% 
Minimum Protection  171 927 0 35,343 1% 
Taxes -2,026 2,678 -37,731 16,737 -15% 
Disposable equivalized income 13,311 8,595 0 127,785 100% 
29 
 
      
Finland - FI (# Obs: 25,350) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 25,049 22,427 0 376,955 98% 
Capital income 2,204 20,832 0 1,900,721 9% 
Unemployment benefits 809 2,255 -2,070 40,784 3% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,805 8,750 0 186,221 15% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 980 3,139 -1,283 49,674 4% 
Education allowance 158 835 -2,349 45,334 1% 
Minimum Protection  1,293 2,094 -2,323 19,580 5% 
Taxes -8,677 9,793 -426,385 12,436 -34% 
Disposable equivalized income 25,620 21,193 9 1,573,952 100% 
      
France - FR (# Obs: 28,251) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 19,036 20,870 0 665,439 78% 
Capital income 3,369 28,775 0 2,738,561 14% 
Unemployment benefits 661 2,236 0 91,400 3% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 5,487 10,202 0 113,561 23% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 184 1,019 0 20,724 1% 
Education allowance 29 218 0 4,333 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,276 1,831 0 23,156 5% 
Taxes -5,691 13,177 -988,665 42,401 -23% 
Disposable equivalized income 24,349 26,830 311 2,099,837 100% 
      
Greece - GR (# Obs: 13,656) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 7,553 10,318 -22,300 198,701 85% 
Capital income 451 2,145 0 63,692 5% 
Unemployment benefits 153 651 0 10,006 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,316 4,669 0 46,500 37% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 150 785 0 15,578 2% 
Education allowance 2 63 0 2,440 0% 
Minimum Protection  211 509 0 5,109 2% 
Taxes -2,982 4,775 -103,592 10,642 -34% 
Disposable equivalized income 8,854 6,031 10 96,917 100% 
      
Ireland - IE (# Obs: 11,861) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 18,699 38,830 0 1,776,488 88% 
Capital income 374 2,486 0 70,572 2% 
Unemployment benefits 1,743 6,472 0 293,044 8% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,486 9,418 0 323,264 16% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 759 2,346 0 39,119 4% 
Education allowance 81 567 0 21,437 0% 
Minimum Protection  2,305 2,844 0 20,882 11% 
Taxes -6,132 26,840 -1,380,535 38,640 -29% 
Disposable equivalized income 21,315 16,165 12 413,586 100% 
      
Italy - IT (# Obs: 47,083) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 17,180 24,940 -9,116 1,747,717 92% 
Capital income 996 3,846 0 216,923 5% 
Unemployment benefits 525 1,969 0 86,487 3% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 5,748 9,702 0 162,727 31% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 246 1,318 0 84,656 1% 
Education allowance 40 590 0 25,783 0% 
Minimum Protection  189 471 0 15,126 1% 
Taxes -6,333 10,840 -788,324 52,477 -34% 
Disposable equivalized income 18,592 15,901 3 976,742 100% 
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Luxembourg - LU (# Obs: 16,110) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 30,524 31,646 -7,647 419,277 88% 
Capital income 1,610 7,347 0 433,157 5% 
Unemployment benefits 673 3,367 0 59,871 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 7,728 15,945 0 179,200 22% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 904 3,553 0 47,568 3% 
Education allowance 225 876 0 9,268 1% 
Minimum Protection  2,950 3,601 0 27,114 8% 
Taxes -9,840 13,311 -325,392 62,097 -28% 
Disposable equivalized income 34,774 20,624 33 450,338 100% 
      
Netherlands - NL (# Obs: 24,909) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 30,011 24,699 -19,594 446,413 124% 
Capital income 1,010 6,133 0 492,779 4% 
Unemployment benefits 461 2,256 -7,513 42,593 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 4,621 10,857 -684 141,701 19% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 700 3,054 -1,286 55,779 3% 
Education allowance 180 643 0 7,611 1% 
Minimum Protection  804 1,782 -1,570 90,908 3% 
Taxes -13,661 11,920 -243,759 31,388 -57% 
Disposable equivalized income 24,126 12,600 167 432,133 100% 
      
Portugal - PT (# Obs: 15,956) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 8,054 10,890 0 369,797 86% 
Capital income 235 1,403 0 51,690 2% 
Unemployment benefits 229 849 0 10,914 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,043 6,318 0 113,411 32% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 226 1,044 0 33,253 2% 
Education allowance 20 200 0 11,294 0% 
Minimum Protection  143 409 0 4,183 2% 
Taxes -2,567 4,692 -189,014 12,849 -27% 
Disposable equivalized income 9,383 7,223 149 180,783 100% 
      
Sweden - SE (# Obs: 16,547) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 26,922 22,967 -16,734 792,976 102% 
Capital income 1,194 5,915 0 211,882 5% 
Unemployment benefits 418 1,673 0 22,838 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 4,729 10,194 0 128,904 18% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 940 2,583 0 31,726 4% 
Education allowance 474 1,301 0 15,149 2% 
Minimum Protection  1,317 2,224 0 14,197 5% 
Taxes -9,517 9,725 -463,433 5,716 -36% 
Disposable equivalized income 26,477 13,091 44 433,713 100% 
      
United Kingdom - UK (# Obs: 23,281) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 18,293 28,261 -13,999 963,099 95% 
Capital income 502 2,841 0 117,426 3% 
Unemployment benefits 105 651 0 39,956 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,731 7,599 0 192,571 19% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 404 1,408 0 15,580 2% 
Education allowance 46 536 0 28,091 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,771 2,845 0 16,952 9% 
Taxes -5,668 12,442 -482,871 83,947 -30% 
Disposable equivalized income 19,185 14,989 41 485,838 100% 
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CEE NMS-13 countries 
     
      
Bulgaria - BG (# Obs: 14,580) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 2,003 2,180 0 52,955 81% 
Capital income 41 366 0 15,928 2% 
Unemployment benefits 28 119 0 2,161 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 552 663 0 4,117 22% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 72 190 0 2,415 3% 
Education allowance 2 25 0 662 0% 
Minimum Protection  55 132 0 1,918 2% 
Taxes -285 583 -23,547 7,197 -12% 
Disposable equivalized income 2,468 1,837 61 35,866 100% 
      
Cyprus - CY (# Obs: 13,376) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 16,594 17,998 0 431,071 84% 
Capital income 747 4,456 0 189,514 4% 
Unemployment benefits 479 5,691 0 301,240 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 3,355 9,304 0 225,728 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 316 1,309 0 17,933 2% 
Education allowance 227 590 0 6,451 1% 
Minimum Protection  709 1,585 0 32,227 4% 
Taxes -2,653 4,323 -61,174 35,969 -13% 
Disposable equivalized income 19,775 17,583 251 429,119 100% 
      
Czech Republic - CZ (# Obs: 20,228) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 6,694 6,385 0 102,090 85% 
Capital income 99 1,085 0 100,747 1% 
Unemployment benefits 27 149 0 3,526 0% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 1,748 2,482 0 21,765 22% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 344 902 0 9,571 4% 
Education allowance 3 60 0 2,850 0% 
Minimum Protection  198 524 0 5,265 3% 
Taxes -1,271 1,677 -26,246 8,866 -16% 
Disposable equivalized income 7,841 4,033 17 104,518 100% 
      
Estonia - EE (# Obs: 14,229) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 4,952 4,666 0 51,244 91% 
Capital income 30 248 0 9,215 1% 
Unemployment benefits 30 184 0 3,894 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 921 1,395 0 8,467 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 204 454 0 4,500 4% 
Education allowance 23 154 0 6,549 0% 
Minimum Protection  341 888 0 9,677 6% 
Taxes -1,044 1,129 -20,282 4,350 -19% 
Disposable equivalized income 5,458 3,311 51 46,093 100% 
      
Croatia - HR (# Obs: 15,127) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 4,636 5,053 0 79,077 86% 
Capital income 72 415 0 7,538 1% 
Unemployment benefits 46 236 0 9,473 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 1,212 1,846 0 25,921 22% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 437 1,169 0 24,960 8% 
Education allowance 9 78 0 1,734 0% 
Minimum Protection  150 372 0 4,610 3% 
Taxes -1,159 1,670 -35,606 6,510 -21% 
Disposable equivalized income 5,403 3,256 106 43,470 100% 
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Hungary - HU (# Obs: 28,420) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 3,347 3,545 -461 48,869 83% 
Capital income 31 450 0 27,840 1% 
Unemployment benefits 67 209 0 6,381 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 906 1,460 0 10,229 22% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 163 465 0 6,049 4% 
Education allowance 10 78 0 2,552 0% 
Minimum Protection  324 474 0 6,379 8% 
Taxes -797 1,141 -13,954 5,513 -20% 
Disposable equivalized income 4,052 2,302 251 44,093 100% 
      
Lithuania - LT (# Obs: 12,631) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 3,499 3,569 0 25,836 82% 
Capital income 69 844 0 26,506 2% 
Unemployment benefits 33 130 0 2,483 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 919 1,201 0 7,375 21% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 224 511 0 4,796 5% 
Education allowance 5 41 0 1,124 0% 
Minimum Protection  181 519 0 8,551 4% 
Taxes -649 857 -7,215 4,205 -15% 
Disposable equivalized income 4,280 2,685 16 32,160 100% 
      
Latvia - LV (# Obs: 15,137) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 3,499 4,033 0 72,707 89% 
Capital income 34 461 0 17,034 1% 
Unemployment benefits 42 273 0 16,133 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 931 1,314 0 18,900 24% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 146 446 0 9,301 4% 
Education allowance 10 81 0 3,349 0% 
Minimum Protection  141 410 0 8,667 4% 
Taxes -853 1,293 -23,599 7,105 -22% 
Disposable equivalized income 3,951 2,940 17 49,324 100% 
      
Malta - MT (# Obs: 11,922) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 10,974 11,152 -1,645 239,448 91% 
Capital income 429 1,592 0 55,675 4% 
Unemployment benefits 120 2,013 0 84,543 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 2,046 3,334 0 69,311 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 225 732 0 7,904 2% 
Education allowance 113 302 0 6,911 1% 
Minimum Protection  429 856 0 10,436 4% 
Taxes -2,316 3,271 -80,747 9,494 -19% 
Disposable equivalized income 12,019 7,586 0 158,774 100% 
      
Poland - PL (# Obs: 37,110) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 4,827 4,773 0 81,314 93% 
Capital income 50 800 0 61,080 1% 
Unemployment benefits 37 206 0 6,461 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 1,396 2,085 0 24,723 27% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 153 485 0 6,314 3% 
Education allowance 7 64 0 2,366 0% 
Minimum Protection  116 295 0 4,043 2% 
Taxes -1,411 1,430 -33,632 11,707 -27% 
Disposable equivalized income 5,175 3,309 11 89,264 100% 
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Romania - RO (# Obs: 17,643) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 1,425 1,655 0 28,636 79% 
Capital income 4 63 0 3,117 0% 
Unemployment benefits 1 16 0 504 0% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 661 939 0 19,253 36% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 56 218 0 2,634 3% 
Education allowance 6 46 0 814 0% 
Minimum Protection  42 103 0 2,104 2% 
Taxes -382 478 -7,240 2,909 -21% 
Disposable equivalized income 1,814 1,135 7 22,004 100% 
      
Slovenia - SI (# Obs: 28,064) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 12,972 10,831 0 124,480 99% 
Capital income 227 1,575 0 38,779 2% 
Unemployment benefits 192 643 0 6,932 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 2,153 3,552 0 22,048 16% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 733 1,565 0 19,317 6% 
Education allowance 167 455 0 9,596 1% 
Minimum Protection  655 1,263 0 17,173 5% 
Taxes -4,034 4,608 -57,583 3,904 -31% 
Disposable equivalized income 13,066 5,966 588 83,637 100% 
      
Slovakia - SK (# Obs: 15,457) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 6,284 4,735 0 43,116 85% 
Capital income 16 158 0 5,701 0% 
Unemployment benefits 41 213 0 4,772 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 1,252 1,844 0 9,577 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 210 591 0 6,337 3% 
Education allowance 14 167 0 5,482 0% 
Minimum Protection  224 395 0 4,129 3% 
Taxes -659 910 -10,133 2,923 -9% 
Disposable equivalized income 7,382 3,508 5 42,212 100% 
      
      
Other countries 
     
      
Switzerland - CH (# Obs: 17,449) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 51,927 45,710 0 641,761 109% 
Capital income 2,757 12,025 0 623,889 6% 
Unemployment benefits 505 2,944 0 64,905 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 8,219 17,046 0 260,150 17% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 893 4,372 0 60,298 2% 
Education allowance 80 734 0 18,717 0% 
Minimum Protection  1,767 2,596 0 74,867 4% 
Taxes -18,632 17,136 -338,881 66,611 -39% 
Disposable equivalized income 47,514 29,067 319 493,796 100% 
      
Iceland - IS (# Obs: 8,966) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 17,558 12,012 0 126,396 113% 
Capital income 1,078 6,028 0 166,458 7% 
Unemployment benefits 350 1,037 0 10,676 2% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 1,494 4,273 0 114,685 10% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 518 1,901 0 29,385 3% 
Education allowance 36 674 0 41,520 0% 
Minimum Protection  790 1,008 0 8,821 5% 
Taxes -6,308 5,496 -64,250 8,126 -41% 
Disposable equivalized income 15,516 8,055 1 153,561 100% 
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Norway - NO (# Obs: 15,515) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Share DPI 
Work income 45,533 35,434 -9,045 663,773 107% 
Capital income 2,025 10,076 0 329,100 5% 
Unemployment benefits 301 1,546 0 30,938 1% 
Old-age and survivor benefits 4,706 12,023 0 94,240 11% 
Sickness/Disability benefits 4,141 7,635 0 67,166 10% 
Education allowance 319 832 0 9,114 1% 
Minimum Protection  1,676 3,261 0 27,796 4% 
Taxes -16,011 15,076 -322,988 8,920 -38% 
Disposable equivalized income 42,691 19,331 0 361,721 100% 
 
 
Table A2: Kernel densities of income in 20 countries 
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Source: own calculations EU-SILC. 
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Figure A1: Decomposition mean equivalized disposable income, 2012 
 
 
 
Notes: * = CEE NMS   (a)=  Non-EU countries 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC  
 
 
  
-20,000
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
R
O
*
B
G
*
L
V
*
H
U
*
L
T
*
P
L
*
H
R
*
E
E
*
S
K
*
C
Z
*
G
R
P
T
M
T
*
S
I* E
S
IS
(a
)
IT U
K
C
Y
*
B
E IE D
E
A
T
N
L
F
R F
I
S
E
D
K
L
U
N
O
(a
)
C
H
(a
)
Taxes
Education allowance
Sickness/Disability benefits
Unemployment benefits
Minimum Protection
Old-age and survivor benefits
Capital income
Work income
Disposable income
38 
 
Appendix B: Linkage polarization estimates and other social indicators, 2012 
 
Figure B1 shows estimates for the polarization indicator, the Gini coefficient, at-risk-of-poverty 
(60% of the median threshold) and the EU-agreed upon social indicator People 
at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion for the countries covered by this study for 2012 (31 
countries).  
 
Figure B1:  Correlation Polarization index, Gini coefficient DPI (equivalized), Poverty rate total 
population (PL60), and People at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion, 2012 
  
  
  
 
 
Note: simple OLS regression; t-values between brackets 
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Table B1 shows estimates for the polarization indicator from EU-SILC. The table provides a 
broad-brush summary of the direction of movement in the indicator in the two sub-periods. 
 
Table B1: Polarization indicator 2004, 2008 and 2012   
                  
      Polarization indicator Change over time 
  Country 
Available 
in EU-SILC 
2004 2008 2012 2004-2008 2008-2012 2004-2012 
                  
West-EU15               
AT Austria 2004-2012 0.183 0.188 0.191 2.9% 1.6% 4.3% 
BE Belgium 2004-2012 0.188 0.194 0.188 3.1% -3.0% 0.0% 
DE Germany 2005-2012 0.191 0.193 0.189 1.4% -2.1% -0.8% 
DK Denmark 2004-2012 0.166 0.191 0.170 15.3% -10.7% 2.9% 
ES  Spain 2006-2012 0.207 0.202 0.209 -2.4% 3.6% 1.1% 
FI Finland 2004-2012 0.187 0.189 0.189 1.0% 0.3% 1.3% 
FR France 2004-2012 . 0.204 0.204 . -0.4% . 
GR Greece 2004-2012 . 0.212 0.204 . -3.7% . 
IE Ireland 2004-2012 0.216 0.215 0.204 -0.5% -4.9% -5.7% 
IT Italy 2004-2012 . 0.200 0.207 . 3.1% . 
LU Luxembourg 2004-2012 0.189 0.212 0.194 11.9% -8.4% 2.5% 
NL  Netherlands 2005-2012 0.172 0.181 0.175 5.5% -3.4% 1.8% 
PT Portugal 2004-2012 . 0.228 0.216 . -5.3% . 
SE Sweden  2004-2012 0.164 0.169 0.174 3.0% 3.4% 6.1% 
UK United Kingdom 2005-2012 0.223 0.217 0.208 -2.8% -4.2% -7.3% 
                  
CEE NMS-13               
BG Bulgaria 2007-2012 . 0.226 0.213 . -5.6% . 
CY  Cyprus 2005-2012 0.199 0.200 0.214 0.7% 6.8% 7.0% 
CZ  Czech Republic 2005-2012 0.186 0.178 0.177 -4.2% -0.4% -4.8% 
EE Estonia 2004-2012 0.220 0.200 0.204 -9.1% 2.1% -7.8% 
HR Croatia 2011-2012 . . 0.205 . . . 
HU  Hungary 2005-2012 0.188 0.182 0.187 -3.0% 2.7% -0.3% 
LT  Lithuania 2005-2012 0.219 0.214 0.206 -2.5% -3.8% -6.5% 
LV Latvia 2005-2012 . 0.239 0.221 . -7.6% . 
MT Malta 2008-2012 . 0.199 0.197 . -1.3% . 
PL  Poland 2005-2012 0.217 0.203 0.199 -6.7% -1.8% -9.1% 
RO Romania 2007-2012 . 0.220 0.207 . -5.8% . 
SI  Slovenia 2005-2012 0.172 0.171 0.173 -0.4% 1.1% 0.6% 
SK  Slovakia 2005-2012 0.186 0.177 0.180 -4.6% 1.9% -2.8% 
                  
Other                 
CH Switzerland 2008-2012 . 0.205 0.195 . -5.1% . 
IS Iceland 2004-2012 0.177 0.191 0.175 7.8% -8.4% -1.2% 
NO Norway 2004-2012 0.188 0.173 0.165 -7.9% -5.0% -14.3% 
 
Note: no data for ES (2004-2005), FR (2004-2006), GR(2004-2006), IT (2004-2006), PT(2004-2006), BG 
(2004-2006), HR(2006-2010), LV (2005-2006), MT(2004-2007), RO(2004-2006), and CH (2004-2007). 
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC 
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Appendix C: Social indicator estimates over time 
Table C1 shows estimates for the polarization indicator, the Gini coefficient, at-risk-of-poverty (60% of the median threshold) and the 
EU-agreed upon social indicator People at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion for the countries covered by this study for the period 
2004-2012 (20 countries). Table C1 provides a summary of the direction of movement in the four indicators over time. Figure 4 (main text) 
show correlation between social indicators over time. 
 
Table C1: Polarization index, Gini coefficient DPI (equivalized), Poverty rate total population (PL60), and People at-risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion, 2004-2012 for selected countries 
 
    
Polarization indicator 
 
Gini coefficient DPI (equivalized) 
 
  
Available 
in EU-SILC 
Level  
around 2004 
Level  
around 2012 
Change 
2004-2012 
Rank 
change 
Level  
around 2004 
Level  
around 2012 
Change 
2004-2012 
Rank 
change 
                    
Austria 2004-2012 0.183 0.191 4.5% (18) 0.258 0.276 7.0% (16) 
Belgium 2004-2012 0.188 0.188 0.0% (12) 0.261 0.265 1.5% (13) 
Cyprus 2005-2012 0.199 0.214 7.5% (20) 0.287 0.310 8.0% (18) 
Czech Republic 2005-2012 0.186 0.177 -4.6% (7) 0.260 0.249 -4.2% (9) 
Denmark 2004-2012 0.166 0.170 2.9% (17) 0.239 0.281 17.6% (20) 
Estonia 2004-2012 0.220 0.204 -7.2% (3) 0.374 0.325 -13.1% (2) 
Finland 2004-2012 0.187 0.189 1.3% (14) 0.255 0.259 1.6% (14) 
Germany 2005-2012 0.191 0.189 -0.8% (10) 0.261 0.283 8.4% (19) 
Hungary 2005-2012 0.188 0.187 -0.3% (11) 0.276 0.269 -2.5% (12) 
Iceland 2004-2012 0.177 0.175 -1.2% (9) 0.241 0.225 -6.6% (6) 
Ireland 2004-2012 0.216 0.204 -5.3% (6) 0.315 0.299 -5.1% (8) 
Lithuania 2005-2012 0.219 0.206 -6.1% (5) 0.363 0.320 -11.8% (3) 
Luxembourg 2004-2012 0.189 0.194 2.5% (16) 0.265 0.280 5.7% (15) 
Netherlands 2005-2012 0.172 0.175 1.8% (15) 0.269 0.254 -5.6% (7) 
Norway 2004-2012 0.188 0.165 -12.5% (1) 0.252 0.225 -10.7% (4) 
Poland 2005-2012 0.217 0.199 -8.3% (2) 0.356 0.309 -13.2% (1) 
Slovakia 2005-2012 0.186 0.180 -2.8% (8) 0.262 0.253 -3.4% (11) 
Slovenia 2005-2012 0.172 0.173 0.6% (13) 0.262 0.253 -3.4% (11) 
Sweden 2004-2012 0.164 0.174 6.5% (19) 0.230 0.248 7.8% (17) 
United Kingdom 2005-2012 0.223 0.208 -6.8% (4) 0.346 0.313 -9.5% (5) 
Mean-20 
 
0.191 0.188 -1.7% 
 
0.282 0.275 -2.4% 
 
Coefficient of variation 0.094 0.074 -22%  0.152 0.107 -30%  
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Poverty rate total population (PL 60) 
 
People at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion 
 
  
Available 
in EU-SILC 
Level  
around 2004 
Level  
around 2012 
Change 
2004-2012 
Rank 
change 
Level  
around 2004 
Level  
around 2012 
Change 
2004-2012 
Rank 
change 
                    
Austria 2004-2012 0.130 0.144 10.8% (15) 0.179 0.185 3.4% (14) 
Belgium 2004-2012 0.143 0.153 7.0% (13) 0.216 0.216 0.0% (12) 
Cyprus 2005-2012 0.161 0.147 -8.7% (7) 0.253 0.271 7.1% (17) 
Czech Republic 2005-2012 0.104 0.096 -7.7% (8) 0.196 0.154 -21.4% (3) 
Denmark 2004-2012 0.109 0.131 20.2% (18) 0.165 0.189 14.5% (19) 
Estonia 2004-2012 0.202 0.175 -13.4% (5) 0.263 0.234 -11.0% (6) 
Finland 2004-2012 0.110 0.132 20.0% (17) 0.172 0.172 0.0% (12) 
Germany 2005-2012 0.122 0.161 32.0% (20) 0.184 0.196 6.5% (16) 
Hungary 2005-2012 0.135 0.140 3.7% (12) 0.321 0.324 0.9% (13) 
Iceland 2004-2012 0.100 0.079 -21.0% (2) 0.137 0.127 -7.3% (9) 
Ireland 2004-2012 0.209 0.157 -24.9% (1) 0.248 0.300 21.0% (20) 
Lithuania 2005-2012 0.205 0.186 -9.3% (6) 0.410 0.325 -20.7% (4) 
Luxembourg 2004-2012 0.127 0.151 18.9% (16) 0.161 0.184 14.3% (18) 
Netherlands 2005-2012 0.107 0.101 -5.6% (10) 0.167 0.150 -10.2% (7) 
Norway 2004-2012 0.108 0.100 -7.4% (9) 0.158 0.137 -13.3% (5) 
Poland 2005-2012 0.205 0.171 -16.6% (3) 0.453 0.267 -41.1% (1) 
Slovakia 2005-2012 0.133 0.132 -0.8% (11) 0.320 0.205 -35.9% (2) 
Slovenia 2005-2012 0.122 0.135 10.7% (14) 0.185 0.196 5.9% (15) 
Sweden 2004-2012 0.113 0.141 24.8% (19) 0.169 0.156 -7.7% (8) 
United Kingdom 2005-2012 0.190 0.160 -15.8% (4) 0.248 0.241 -2.8% (10) 
Mean-20 
 
0.142 0.140 1.5% 
 
0.230 0.211 -8.2% 
 
Coefficient of variation 0.266 0.195 -27%  0.367 0.276 -25%  
 
Source: own calculations EU-SILC
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Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis polarization measure DER for a range of values for α 
We computed polarization measure DER for a range of values of α across countries for 2012. Low 
values for α produce values of DER close to values of Gini (with high Pearson correlation), while 
α = 1 leads to high disparity between Gini and the DER indices (with lower Pearson correlation). 
  
Country 
DER 
(a=0) 
DER 
(a=0.5) 
DER 
(a = 1) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Poverty 
(PL60) 
Social 
exclusion 
Mean 
DPI 
NO(a)  0.218 0.165 0.150 0.225 0.100 0.137 42.691 
DK  0.227 0.170 0.154 0.281 0.131 0.190 31.073 
SI*  0.236 0.173 0.147 0.237 0.135 0.196 13.066 
SE  0.240 0.174 0.148 0.248 0.141 0.156 26.477 
NL   0.235 0.175 0.159 0.254 0.101 0.150 24.126 
IS(a)  0.237 0.175 0.155 0.240 0.079 0.127 15.516 
CZ*  0.243 0.177 0.158 0.249 0.096 0.154 7.841 
SK*  0.252 0.180 0.150 0.253 0.132 0.205 7.382 
HU*  0.268 0.187 0.156 0.269 0.140 0.324 4.052 
BE  0.267 0.188 0.154 0.265 0.153 0.216 20.445 
DE  0.275 0.189 0.155 0.283 0.161 0.196 21.423 
FI  0.274 0.189 0.161 0.259 0.132 0.172 25.620 
AT  0.284 0.191 0.155 0.276 0.144 0.185 23.266 
LU  0.277 0.194 0.162 0.280 0.151 0.184 34.774 
CH(a)  0.289 0.195 0.157 0.288 0.159 0.175 47.514 
MT*  0.284 0.197 0.162 0.271 0.151 0.231 12.019 
PL*  0.301 0.199 0.157 0.309 0.171 0.267 5.175 
FR  0.307 0.204 0.174 0.305 0.141 0.191 24.349 
EE*  0.310 0.204 0.159 0.325 0.175 0.234 5.458 
IE  0.308 0.204 0.167 0.299 0.157 0.300 21.315 
GR  0.318 0.204 0.156 0.343 0.231 0.346 8.854 
HR*  0.315 0.205 0.152 0.309 0.204 0.326 5.403 
LT*  0.313 0.206 0.162 0.320 0.186 0.325 4.280 
IT  0.325 0.207 0.161 0.319 0.194 0.299 18.592 
RO*  0.324 0.207 0.153 0.332 0.226 0.417 1.814 
UK  0.317 0.208 0.171 0.313 0.160 0.241 19.185 
ES   0.331 0.209 0.156 0.350 0.208 0.272 13.311 
BG*  0.338 0.213 0.161 0.336 0.212 0.493 2.468 
CY*  0.326 0.214 0.175 0.310 0.147 0.271 19.775 
PT  0.342 0.216 0.170 0.345 0.179 0.253 9.383 
LV*  0.313 0.221 0.169 0.357 0.192 0.362 3.951 
Mean-31 0.287 0.195 0.159 0.292 0.158 0.245 
 
               Notes: * = CEE NMS   (a)=  Non-EU 
countries       
Pearson Correlation  
DER 
(a=0) 
DER 
(a=0.5) 
DER 
(a = 1) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Poverty 
(PL60) 
Social 
exclusion 
Mean 
DPI 
DER (a=0) 1 
      
DER (a=0.5) 0.974** 1 
     
DER (a = 1) 0.582** 0.671** 1 
    
Gini coefficient 0.914** 0.915** 0.504** 1 
   
Poverty (PL60) 0.825** 0.778** 0.128 0.863** 1 
  
Social exclusion 0.730** 0.717** 0.208 0.745** 0.823** 1 
 
Mean disposable income (DPI) -0.433* -0.436* -0.045 -0.454* -0.458** -0.647** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
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Appendix E: Detailed decomposition change polarization indicator 2004-2012 
In the main text the polarization indicator of equivalized disposable income was decomposed 
into three main income components; here these partial effects of each income source will be 
further decomposed into a growth effect and redistributive effect, following similar studies on 
poverty and income inequality (Jain & Tendulkar, 1990, Kakwani & Subbarao, 1990, Datt & 
Ravallion,1992,and Zhang & Wan 2006). The growth effect shows changes in polarization led by 
the changes in the average income component. The redistribution effect represents polarization 
changes due to resource reallocation. We follow Wang & Wan (2014). Their extension permits 
examination of how polarization will change if only the mean source income 𝜇𝑥 changes or if only 
the source income dispersion changes. Let 𝐿𝑥denote Lorenz curve of income x, t indexes time 
period, these two effects can be disentangled, as shown below:  
∆𝑝(𝑥) = 𝑝(𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝑥𝑡) 
             = 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) 
             =
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) 
            +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) +
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) −
1
2
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) 
            =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1)]} 
            +
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)]} 
𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1)]} 
𝑹𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕 =
1
2
{[𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑥𝑡)] + [𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) − 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)]} 
To estimate both effects, two counterfactual income distributions have to be simulated: (1) the 
income distributions of 𝑥 with only its mean changed and (2) the changed distribution. The 
former can be expressed as 𝑌𝑥(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) = 𝑌𝑥 (𝜇𝑥𝑡 ∗
𝜇𝑥𝑡+1
𝜇𝑥𝑡
, 𝐿𝑥𝑡), from which the polarization index of 
𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) can be estimated. The difference between 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) and 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡) is the growth 
effect. Similarly, the difference between  𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1)  and 𝑝(𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡)  is defined as the 
redistribution effect. Further, letting the starting point be 𝑡 + 1 rather than 𝑡 permits one to 
obtain 𝑌𝑥(𝜇𝑥𝑡 , 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1) = 𝑌𝑥 (𝜇𝑥𝑡+1 ∗
𝜇𝑥𝑡
𝜇𝑥𝑡+1
, 𝐿𝑥𝑡+1). These two partial effects are summed to estimate the 
total change of the polarization indicator over time. 
Table E1 shows the changes of income polarization in 20 countries from 2004/5 to 2012, further 
splitting the countries into groups (West-EU15, CEE NMS-13 and other European countries). 
Countries are ranked in order of their change in polarization 2004-2012 from largest to smallest. 
Twelve countries have seen a non-positive change of polarization, although the magnitude is 
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mostly rather small due to the short period under study. Some countries show lower (higher) 
polarization compared to other countries. 
Table E1 decompose total change into a growth and redistributive effects by country. For our 
20-country-average polarization decreased in the period 2004-2012. The growth effect did not 
have any effect on polarization on average, while the redistributive effect appears to be 
polarization-reducing. However, cross-country variation is rather large. 
Our analyses may be seen as an assessment how changes of the generosity of tax-benefit 
systems over the period 2004-2012 have had an impact on income polarization. The 
polarizing-reducing redistributive effect across our 20-country-average is mainly the result of 
the tax-benefit systems in European countries. These systems were more effective in offsetting 
income polarization in 2012 than in the mid-2000’s in all countries, with Sweden, Cyprus and 
Hungary as exceptions. So, social policy changes made by most European countries in the period 
2004-2012 did have an anti-poverty and equalizing effect, even if other factors as market 
incomes were pushing in the other direction and the overall results were disappointing (e.g. in 
the case of poverty reduction). 
Table E1 presents rather stable income polarization over the decade in most West-EU15 
countries, and somewhat lower polarization in CEE NMS countries. We do not find that 
tax-benefit policies had become less effective before or after the Great Recession. Among the 
total population in European countries, both market income polarization (labor and capital) and 
redistribution from social benefits and taxes rose, on average. As a result, the tax-benefit 
systems were more effective in offsetting income polarization in 2012 than in the mid-2000’s. 
Detailed decomposition results for the sub-periods 2004-2008 and 2008-2012 are presented in 
tables E2 and E3.  
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Table E1: Detailed decomposition change polarization indicator 2004-2012 
    Polarization indicator Decomposition of change polarization indicator 2004-2012 
Country 
Available 
in EU-SILC 
Around 
2004 
Around 
2012 
Change 2004-2012 
Partial effect:  
Market income 
Partial effect:  
Social benefits 
Partial effect:  
Taxes 
    
    
Total 
change 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
West EU-15                         
Sweden  2004-2012 0.164 0.174 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.006 0.000 -0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.003 
Austria 2005-2012 0.186 0.191 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
Denmark 2004-2012 0.166 0.170 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Luxembourg 2004-2012 0.189 0.194 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Netherlands 2005-2012 0.172 0.175 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.004 
Finland 2004-2012 0.187 0.189 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Belgium 2004-2012 0.188 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 
Germany 2005-2012 0.191 0.189 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Ireland 2004-2012 0.216 0.204 -0.012 -0.002 -0.009 0.008 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
United Kingdom 2005-2012 0.223 0.208 -0.015 0.001 -0.016 -0.020 0.012 0.012 -0.014 0.009 -0.014 
Mean West EU15 0.188 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
                          
CEE NMS-13                         
Cyprus 2005-2012 0.199 0.214 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.006 -0.003 0.002 
Slovenia 2005-2012 0.172 0.173 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Hungary 2005-2012 0.188 0.187 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 
Czech Republic 2006-2012 0.182 0.177 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.015 -0.009 -0.011 0.005 -0.004 0.000 
Lithuania 2005-2012 0.219 0.206 -0.013 0.001 -0.015 0.014 -0.011 -0.010 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
Slovakia 2006-2012 0.196 0.180 -0.015 -0.003 -0.013 0.007 -0.012 -0.013 -0.002 0.003 0.002 
Estonia 2004-2012 0.220 0.204 -0.016 0.000 -0.016 0.013 -0.014 -0.012 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
Poland 2005-2012 0.217 0.199 -0.018 0.000 -0.018 0.013 -0.018 -0.011 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
Mean CEE NMS   0.199 0.193 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
                          
Other                         
Iceland 2004-2012 0.177 0.175 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.010 0.012 0.009 -0.006 0.001 -0.008 
Norway 2004-2012 0.188 0.165 -0.024 -0.001 -0.023 0.011 -0.017 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
                          
Mean European Countries (20) 0.192 0.188 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
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Table E2: Detailed decomposition change polarization indicator 2004-2008 
    Polarization indicator Decomposition of change polarization indicator 2004-2008 
Country 
Available 
in EU-SILC 
Around 
2004 
Around 
2008 
Change 2004-2008 
Partial effect:  
Market income 
Partial effect:  
Social benefits 
Partial  
effect:  
Taxes 
    
    
Total 
change 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
West EU-15                       
United Kingdom 2005-2008 0.223 0.217 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
Ireland 2004-2008 0.216 0.215 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Finland 2004-2008 0.187 0.189 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Austria 2005-2008 0.186 0.188 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
Germany 2005-2008 0.191 0.193 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
Sweden  2004-2008 0.164 0.169 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
Belgium 2004-2008 0.188 0.194 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Netherlands 2005-2008 0.172 0.181 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.004 
Luxembourg 2004-2008 0.189 0.212 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.006 
Denmark 2004-2008 0.166 0.191 0.025 0.001 0.024 0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.008 
Mean West EU15 0.188 0.195 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
                          
CEE NMS-13                       
Estonia 2004-2008 0.220 0.200 -0.020 -0.001 -0.020 0.013 -0.018 -0.012 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Slovakia 2006-2008 0.196 0.177 -0.019 0.000 -0.018 0.009 -0.015 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
Poland 2005-2008 0.217 0.203 -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.014 -0.016 -0.011 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
Hungary 2005-2008 0.188 0.182 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
Lithuania 2005-2008 0.219 0.214 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.020 -0.013 -0.015 0.005 -0.006 0.002 
Czech Republic 2006-2008 0.182 0.178 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.010 -0.007 -0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
Slovenia 2005-2008 0.172 0.171 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Cyprus 2005-2008 0.199 0.200 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Mean CEE NMS 0.199 0.191 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 0.010 -0.010 -0.007 0.001 -0.003 0.000 
                          
Other                         
Norway 2004-2008 0.188 0.173 -0.015 0.000 -0.015 0.006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
Iceland 2004-2008 0.177 0.191 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
                          
Mean European Countries (20) 0.192 0.193 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
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Table E3: Detailed decomposition change polarization indicator 2008-2012 
    Polarization indicator Decomposition of change polarization indicator 2008-2012 
Country 
Available 
in EU-SILC 
Around 
2008 
Around 
2012 
Change 2008-2012 
Partial effect: Market 
income 
Partial effect: Social 
benefits 
Partial effect: Taxes 
    
    
Total 
change 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
Growth 
effects 
Redistributive 
effects 
West EU-15                       
Denmark 2008-2012 0.191 0.170 -0.020 0.000 -0.021 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.000 -0.012 
Luxembourg 2008-2012 0.212 0.194 -0.018 0.000 -0.018 0.002 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 
Ireland 2008-2012 0.215 0.204 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 
United Kingdom 2008-2012 0.217 0.208 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 -0.012 0.010 0.007 -0.010 0.005 -0.010 
Netherlands 2008-2012 0.181 0.175 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
Belgium 2008-2012 0.194 0.188 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 
Germany 2008-2012 0.193 0.189 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Finland 2008-2012 0.189 0.189 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Austria 2008-2012 0.188 0.191 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Sweden  2008-2012 0.169 0.174 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
Mean West EU15 0.195 0.188 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 
                          
CEE NMS-13                       
Lithuania 2008-2012 0.214 0.206 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 -0.005 0.003 0.003 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 
Poland 2008-2012 0.203 0.199 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Czech Republic 2008-2012 0.178 0.177 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.001 0.000 
Slovenia 2008-2012 0.171 0.173 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Slovakia 2008-2012 0.177 0.180 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.004 
Estonia 2008-2012 0.200 0.204 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Hungary 2008-2012 0.182 0.187 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.014 0.008 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.001 
Cyprus 2008-2012 0.200 0.214 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.008 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
Mean CEE NMS 0.191 0.193 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
                          
Other                         
Iceland 2008-2012 0.191 0.175 -0.016 0.001 -0.017 -0.002 0.006 0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.013 
Norway 2008-2012 0.173 0.165 -0.009 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.007 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
                          
Mean European Countries (20) 0.192 0.188 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 
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